

Administrative - Internal Use Only

DDS&T-169-83

1 MAR 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Public Affairs Division

FROM: R. E. Hineman
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Oral Presentation - Appearance Before
Non-Government Group - [REDACTED]

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1. Under the provisions of [REDACTED] the attached oral presentation by [REDACTED], FBIS/DDS&T to the Mid-Atlantic Regional Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies on 5 March 1983 is approved.

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2. The content of this presentation has been reviewed by this office and is considered unclassified and consistent with established policies of the Agency and the U.S. Government.

3. Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, please contact this office directly.

[REDACTED]
R. E. Hineman

STAT

Attachment:
As stated

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FBIS-204-83
17 February 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

VIA: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Chief, Analysis Group, FBIS

FROM: [REDACTED]

STAT

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Oral Presentation

1. I request approval to present orally remarks based on the attached outline, entitled "Ideological Change and the Chinese View of the Soviet Union."

2. When approved, I intend to give the presentation at a panel at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies on 5 March in Princeton, New Jersey. The panel's other participants are [REDACTED] of FBIS, [REDACTED] of Princeton University, [REDACTED] of Swarthmore College, and [REDACTED] of Georgetown University.

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3. None of the material to be presented is, to my knowledge, classified.

4. I am not under cover. I will be identified as an Agency employee but will evoke the standard disclaimer that the views expressed by me are my own and not necessarily those of the Agency.

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Attachment:
As stated

I have reviewed the attached text and, to the best of my knowledge, have found it to be unclassified.

STAT

[REDACTED]
Director, FBIS

17 FEB 1983
Date

I have reviewed the attached text and, to the best of my knowledge, have found it to be unclassified and approve it for presentation orally.

STAT

[REDACTED]
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

28 FEB 1983
Date



1395-83

5-17-83

Princeton AAASS Presentation, 5 March 83: "Ideological Change and the Chinese View of the Soviet Union"

-It has been frequently noted in the Western press and in academic circles that in recent years that the Chinese image of the USSR, as it appears in PRC media, has shifted perceptibly. (Cite: reduction in harshness of Chinese rhetoric; dropping of "revisionist" epithet). By and large these observers have speculated that these shifts reflect a new, more favorable Chinese view of the Soviet Union and that therefore presage a more amenable PRC approach to Sino-Soviet relations, even a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. (Cite: Thornton book; Hinton article in Stuart & Tow book; Whiting article in NY Times).

-A closer examination of China's public statements and commentary on the USSR suggests, however, a different perspective, particularly when viewed in the context of the Chinese party's own evolving ideological doctrines over the same period. Such an examination suggests specifically that the shifts in China's public view of the Soviet Union and in the Chinese side of Sino-Soviet polemics in recent years are much more the product of Beijing's re-shaping its ideological polemic with Moscow in response to a fundamental transformation of the CCP's own ideological, and primarily domestic political position than the result of a Chinese reassessment of the USSR per se. As such, the changes in Beijing's public image of the Soviet Union in recent years give no substantive grounds for believing that Beijing has revised its approach to Sino-Soviet relations.

-The traditional Chinese view of the Soviet Union as it emerged in the late 1950's and early 1960's:

+Based on Mao's evolving views on the tensions between the demands of revolutionary principle and of modernization: gradually concludes that the social stratification that accompanies economic development require defense of the egalitarian communist ideals on which the PRC was founded: this view calling for renewed "class struggle" under socialism itself-- a theory of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat"--came to be called Mao's key contribution to the advance of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

+The theory of "continuing the revolution" formed the ideological basis both of Mao's attacks on his domestic opponents (culminating in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) and of his attacks on the Soviet Union. (Cite: "Nine Commentaries" in RED FLAG: "On Khrushchev's Phony Communism," 1964)

+Over the years until Mao's death, this Maoist critique of the USSR and his own domestic opponents as "revisionist" (i.e. abandoning the class struggle internationally and at home) lay at the heart of China's public image of the USSR and the way the Soviet Union was treated in PRC media.

-1967 RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint editorial

-1968: Zhou Enlai speech on Soviet "social-imperialism" (explain term) in wake of Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia

-1973: Zhou Enlai address to 10th CCP Congress

-1975-76: study "dictatorship of proletariat" campaign, anti-right deviationist wind campaign, and "Water Margin" campaign: 1 Jan 76 PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.

+After Mao's death, the new Hua leadership firmly endorsed the Maoist thesis of "continuing the revolution" at the 11th CCP Congress, and Sino-Soviet polemics persisted in traditional track.

-Since 1978, however, the Hua leadership has gradually yielded ground to a reform leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping. A keystone both in Deng's political combat with Hua and in his efforts to legitimize his broad political, social and economic reforms has been the overthrow of the Maoist thesis.

+1978 "practice is the sole criterion of truth" campaign and the 3rd Plenum.

+1981 6th Plenum "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC."

-The essence of this ideological transformation is to negate the leading role of class struggle in Chinese socialism and to substitute economic development. The new doctrine thus sought to legitimize the "conservative" policies associated with the reforms. Although it has served Deng's politics well, the transformation was not without certain domestic side-effects which have caused Deng and his reformers great difficulty: by acknowledging Mao's errors and the party's fallibility, Deng has created a "crisis of confidence" (to use PEOPLE'S DAILY's term) in Chinese communism, and accordingly China's domestic scene in recent years has witnessed considerable ideological thrashing about.

+ "agrarian socialism" controversy

+ resurrection of Asiatic mode of production thesis and its pitfalls

+ the emergence of "scientific socialism" at the 12th CCP Congress, 1982.

-As Mao's "continuing the revolution" thesis has eroded as the foundation of China's domestic policies since 1978, its role in shaping China's polemics against and view of the Soviet Union has similarly eroded. Closely tailing the ups and downs of Beijing's own domestic ideological doctrines, the terms of Beijing's critique of the USSR has similarly been re-defined.

+Through 1978, the "revisionist" label Beijing applied to Moscow dropped out of usage.

+By 1979, Beijing tentatively redefined revisionism in more geopolitical terms instead of the traditional terms based on class struggle: Ye Jianying 1979 national day speech: "social-imperialism abroad, social fascism at home."

+By 1981, the 6th Plenum "History" resolution redefines the Sino-Soviet polemic in altogether geopolitical terms: Mao's struggle against Soviet hegemonism and "big-nation chauvinism" was "just."

+China's dispute with Moscow now was no longer an "anti-revisionist" struggle, it was a struggle against Soviet "hegemonism."

-In so doing, Deng Xiaoping has effectively demolished the ideological basis of Mao's domestic policies while rehabilitating Mao's polemic against the Soviet Union into a context of prevailing Chinese attitudes toward Moscow. Thus Beijing's substantive differences with Moscow have not changed--only the way they are presented.

+In party-to-party ties, Beijing has drastically revised its approach toward establishing fraternal ties with communist and "progressive" foreign parties; that Beijing nevertheless remains unyielding regarding ties with the CPSU is clear (Cite: RED FLAG articles, Hu Yaobang remarks to Italian, Spanish CP leaders in XIINHUA; LIAOWANG article on foreign party relations), suggesting Beijing's revised approach is tactical, not strategic.

+Beijing's substantive negotiating position as PRC media have elaborated it sticks to geopolitical issues which now form the core of China's ideological dispute with Moscow.

+Chinese media's image of Soviet socialism remains negative, and despite the dropping of Maoist terminology, it is here that the parallelism with the Maoist polemic remains strikingly intact.